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BLURRED LINES: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
NONCONFORMITY IN TITLE VII
ABSTRACT
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex is read broadly
to include gender nonconformity. Although social scientists have documented
the historic link between the homosocial performance of sexual orientation and
the achievement of hegemonic masculinity within the modern workplace,
courts continue to struggle with the task of defining the scope of protected
gender nonconforming conduct. As many within the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender community continue to demand equal access, recognition, and
employment opportunity, only twenty-one states provide statutory protections
for LGBT persons or their allies, and courts utilize a number of judicial limits
in an attempt to readily distinguish claims based on “sex” and those based on
“sexual orientation.” However well-intended, such tools frustrate the
legislative goals underlying Title VII and negate social science that suggests a
new, fluid conceptualization of gender normativity is in order—one capable of
recognizing sexual orientation’s unique role in achieving and reinforcing
gender.
Through the use of such sociological research, legal scholarship, and
judicial opinions, this Comment examines the complex scope of sex and gender
within Title VII jurisprudence. Nominally, this Comment proposes the use of an
expansive interpretation of sex and what constitutes discrimination based on
sex and discourages the imposition of court-crafted limits to the scope of
conduct capable of classification as gender nonconforming. Critically, this
Comment does not assert that LGBT identity, and expressive manifestations of
such identity, universally fall under the purview of Title VII. Rather, this
Comment suggests that social science indicates that sexuality can, and often
does, play a pivotal role in the public construction and reinforcement of
gender.
This Comment then examines the implications of alternative approaches to
expanding protection for sexual minorities, including statutory expansions to
class-based, federal civil rights laws and vulnerability scholarship, which
advances the abolition of class-based structures as a means of protecting equal
employment opportunity in the United States. It concludes that critics of an
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expansive, and more sociologically informed examination of gender, must find
solace in the Court’s delegated responsibility to interpret and define the scope
of discrimination prohibited under Title VII and, instead, focus criticism on the
abuse of judicial biases, which mar outcomes and create inconsistencies.
Ultimately, this Comment recognizes the fluidity of gender as a social
construction in contemporary, hegemonic society and charges the Court to
fulfill its duty to examine the array of conduct, including LGBT identity,
association, and outward manifestations of such identity, which may, and often
do, serve as building blocks for the achievement of gender within the context of
a sex-stereotyping suit.
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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the
workplace “because of . . . sex.”1 Since its enactment, courts have struggled in
applying its prohibition in the context of gender nonconformity.2 While the
Supreme Court has found claims of sex-based harassment and discrimination
cognizable when carried out by members of the same sex,3 as well as proof of
a harasser’s sexual orientation sufficient to meet the statutory threshold,4 courts
have refused to apply Title VII in the context of discrimination “because of”
sexual orientation.5 Nonetheless, many circuits have noted that when “utilized
by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff . . . gender stereotyping claims can easily
present problems for an adjudicator.”6 While the Court has recognized claims
under Title VII where a female failed to present herself in a manner deemed
sufficiently “feminin[e]” within the workplace,7 the Court left open the
question of whether gender nonconformity extends to conduct perceived to be
or actually related with same-sex sexual attraction. In the absence of clarity,
federal circuit courts have adopted a variety of imprecise limiting principles in
an attempt to avoid unilaterally amending Title VII.8
This Comment argues that the scope of discrimination “because of . . . sex”
under Title VII9 should be read expansively, in light of recent Supreme Court
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified as amended in
Title 42 of the U.S. Code. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
2 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that discrimination
based upon the association with a known homosexual coworker is not actionable under Title VII).
3 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“[I]t would be unwise to
presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other
members of their group.”).
4 See id. at 80 (“The same chain of inference [of discrimination] would be available to a plaintiff
alleging same-sex harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”); see also
Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759 (holding discrimination on the basis of association with an avowedly homosexual was
not a sufficient basis for a Title VII claim of sex stereotyping discrimination).
5 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011) (providing that a
plaintiff cannot “‘bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII’ under the guise of a
sex-stereotyping claim”).
6 See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763
(quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218).
7 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989); see also id. at 258 (“[W]hen a plaintiff in a
Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid . . . liability only by providing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken . . . gender into account . . . .”).
8 See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (limiting application of Title VII in sex-stereotyping claims to
outward mannerisms observed in the workplace).
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).

PEEBLES GALLEYSPROOFS2

914

2/19/2015 12:41 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:911

jurisprudence,10 to encompass outward manifestations of gender
nonconformity. Such nonconformity should not be limited to mannerisms,
gestures, or workplace demeanor but should also be read to include displays of
personal identification and affiliations that fall beyond the boundaries of
conventional behavior for members of a particular sex. Discrimination
motivated in part by a person’s gender nonconformity, although used to
identify or classify a person as a sexual minority, should fall well within the
scope of “but for” discrimination based on sex stereotyping. Finally, this
Comment argues that such expansive interpretation of the statutory language,
albeit an essential step, may inadequately serve to curb discriminatory animus
based on sex, directed particularly toward gays and lesbians whose
mannerisms and outward demeanor may meet societal norms surrounding
gender but who nonetheless openly identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, or
questioning. Accordingly, this Comment explores an innovative alternative to
Title VII’s class-based structure that more adequately accounts for exploited
vulnerability, universal to the human condition.
First, Part I of this Comment examines the conventional approach to
sex-based claims of discrimination under Title VII, paying particular attention
to piecemeal expansions in its scope. It then reviews sociological
interpretations of sex and gender as analytically distinct concepts and examines
the impact of Windsor on contemporary arguments of Title VII’s application to
sexual minorities. Second, Part II posits an expansive interpretation,
encompassing outward displays of same-sex sexual attraction and actual or
perceived lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)11 identity within the
scope of gender nonconformity for Title VII purposes. Finally, Part III
discusses the implications and prospective challenges of such an expansive
interpretation. It both examines critics and the challenges faced by sexual
minorities who, beyond their identification as gay or lesbian, conform to
societal norms of gender in stating a claim of discrimination based on sex.

10 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (declaring the Defense of Marriage
Act’s definition of marriage to be unconstitutional); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013)
(finding backers of Proposition 8 in California, which effectively banned same-sex marriage in the State of
California, lacked appellate standing).
11 For purposes of this Comment, LGBT is defined broadly and represents any and all gradations of
identification as a sexual minority, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, questioning, genderqueer,
pansexual, transgender, transsexual, or third-gender. Historically, the term represents only a limited class of
sexual orientations. Here, however, the term will also encompass persons who, regardless of personal
identification as a sexual minority, are associated with or conflated with nonheterosexual persons.
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Part III concludes by briefly exploring a new, more efficient statutory vision
that reflects contemporary vulnerability scholarship.
I. DECONSTRUCTING GENDER: A GREAT INTERPRETIVE DIVIDE
This Part serves primarily to contrast the two major contemporary
approaches to examining gender and sex: section A discusses the
jurisprudential approach, which both limits the scope of and collapses together
the concepts of gender and sex and section B discusses the sociological
approach, treating the two as fluid, yet analytically distinct, concepts. This Part
then, in section C, examines potential arguments for expanded protections for
actual or perceived gender nonconforming gays and lesbians rooted in the U.S.
Constitution, in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of . . . sex,”12 or “to limit, segregate, or classify his [or
her] employees or applicants for employment in any way which would . . . tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect [their] status as an employee, because of . . . sex.”13 But what did the
statute’s drafters understand “sex” to encompass? If gender could be read to
fall within the scope of the term “sex,” how would it be defined? And, could
expressions of sexual orientation ever fall within the boundaries of gender as a
sociological construct?
A. The Conventional Approach: Avoiding an Expansive Interpretation of
Title VII
Since 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “gender” and gender
expression as falling within the statutory scope of Title VII.14 In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court expanded the scope of “sex” dramatically,
interpreting the prohibition of sex discrimination to mandate that “gender must

12

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Title VII also extends its protections against discrimination because of a person’s
“race, color, religion . . . or national origin. Id.
14 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240, 251 (1989) (holding that sex stereotyping is a
form of discrimination under Title VII).
13
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be irrelevant to employment decisions.”15 Moreover, the Court also recognized
the pragmatic reality of motivating factors in workplace discrimination:
[W]e also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those
decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
considerations. When, therefore, an employer considers both gender
and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision
was “because of” sex and the other, legitimate considerations—even
if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision
would have been the same if gender had not been taken into
account.16

However, the Court held that in the context of sex stereotyping, regardless of
other factors influencing an ultimate employment decision, “an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”17
Since Price Waterhouse, courts have struggled to apply Title VII in a
number of contexts that have worked a piecemeal expansion on the scope of
sex. In 1998, the Court first applied Title VII to claims of sex-based
harassment at the hands of actors of the same sex.18 In Oncale, a male
petitioner, who had alleged sexual harassment by male coworkers working on
an oil platform operated by respondent in the Gulf of Mexico, challenged the
Fifth Circuit’s determination that he lacked a sufficient cause of action under
Title VII for harassment by male coworkers.19 After recognizing that
male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was “not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,” the Court found no
justification in the statutory language or precedent for excluding same-sex
harassment claims from coverage.20 Ultimately, the Court held the critical
issue of Title VII is disadvantage: “whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed.”21
While the Oncale Court notably expanded coverage of Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” to encompass conduct at the
15

Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 250.
18 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
19 Id. at 77.
20 Id. at 79.
21 Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
16
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hands of members of the same sex, the Court noted in dicta that sexual
orientation could be relevant in proving the inferential “chain” that conduct
was “motivated by sexual desire.”22 Although the Court made clear that
“harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex,” the Court provided that use of
“derogatory terms” by members of the same sex that “make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of [members of a
particular sex] in the workplace” are sufficient grounds for a claim under Title
VII.23
Nonetheless, Title VII is not a mere civility code. The Court noted that
Title VII “does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex.”24 Likewise, the
Court recognized that mere horseplay is beyond the scope of the prohibition:
“The prohibition on harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality
nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively
offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.”25 While
sexually related conduct itself is not prohibited, the Court recognized that
context is important in the application of Title VII.26 Not only is “the objective
severity of harassment . . . judged from the perspective of a reasonable person
in the plaintiff’s position,” in the context of same-sex harassment, “the social
context” in which the behavior occurs must be carefully considered.27
That discrimination solely on the basis of “sexual orientation” is not
actionable under Title VII is settled.28 In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the generally accepted principle that Title VII does
not recognize claims based solely on sexual orientation, providing (perhaps
erroneously) that “sexual orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII.”29
However, the Supreme Court has yet to clearly draw a hard line between a
claim of discrimination based on sex and a claim of discrimination based on
22

See id.
Id.
24 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (“A professional football player’s working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the
field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male
or female) back at the office.”).
28 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, 432 F. App’x 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011).
29 Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
23
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sexual orientation in the context of sex stereotyping. In 2006, in Vickers v.
Fairfield Medical Center, the Sixth Circuit considered the question of whether
a person “subject to daily instances of harassment” in the form of slurs,
“frequent derogatory comments regarding . . . sexual preferences,” “vulgar
gestures,” physical harassment, and “simulated sex,” could bring forth a
Title VII claim after befriending an openly gay coworker.30 The plaintiff,
Vickers, relied on the “theory of sex stereotyping adopted by the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse to support both his sex discrimination and sexual
harassment claims.”31 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, finding that Title VII does not protect individuals
from discrimination based on sexual orientation or “being perceived as
homosexual.”32 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the theory
of sex stereotyping was “not broad enough to encompass” discrimination in
response to behaviors which were neither “observed at work” nor
“affect[ed] . . . job performance.”33 Ultimately, the court held the Title VII
claims failed because the plaintiff had not “allege[d] that he did not conform to
traditional gender [norms] in any observable way.”34
Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged its own precedent that “[s]ex
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is
impermissible discrimination”35 and recognized that “individuals who are
perceived as or who identify as homosexuals are not barred from bringing a
claim for sex discrimination under Title VII,”36 the Vickers court suggested
mere association with openly homosexual peers or organizations could not
constitute such “gender non-conforming behavior.”37
Nevertheless, the court failed to consider any real possibility that such
affiliation or association could, indeed, violate any substantive societal gender
norm. Moreover, the court left open the question of how such a principle
would be applied in a case where the plaintiff was openly gay, lesbian,
bisexual, queer, or questioning.38 In Vickers, the plaintiff did not disclose
30

Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 762 (internal citations omitted).
32 Id. at 761.
33 Id. at 763.
34 Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
35 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
36 Vickers, 453 F.3d at 762.
37 Id. at 763.
38 See id. at 763–64 (citing Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005)). The Sixth
Circuit recognized the problem of applying Title VII in the context of an openly gay plaintiff, providing that
31
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whether he was, in fact, homosexual; yet, the court found his allegation
constituted a prohibited attempt to “bootstrap protection for sexual orientation
into Title VII.”39
However, Judge David M. Lawson argued in a dissent for adopting a
broader conceptualization of gender normativity. Lawson critiqued the
majority for limiting the scope of Price Waterhouse to only those “behavior[s]
and appearances that manifest themselves in the workplace.”40 In Judge
Lawson’s view, the majority opinion dismissed “private sexual conduct,
beliefs, or practices that an employee might adopt or display elsewhere,” as
incongruent
with
any
“outward
workplace
manifestation
of
less-than-masculine gender characteristics.”41 Paying special attention to the
context of mixed-motive claims, where “a fact finder could infer that sex (and
not simply homosexuality) played a role in the employment decision,” the
dissent argued that “drawing the line” should not occur at the mere pleading
stage in such contexts.42
Finding Vickers’s conduct of befriending an admitted homosexual
sufficient to establish his perceived failure to conform with contextual gender
norms, Judge Lawson provided that such facts “provide a basis for the
inference that [Vickers] was perceived as effeminate and therefore unworthy”
of being tolerated in the workplace.43 Judge Lawson’s dissent expressly
sympathizes with an interpretation of Title VII capable of finding that
associations with avowedly gay and lesbian persons can constitute behavior
“not masculine enough or feminine enough” to be tolerated in the workplace
context.44 While the complaint in Vickers was “replete with allegations that the
plaintiff also was harassed because of his perceived homosexuality,” Judge
Lawson posited that mere homosexuality could not serve to disqualify relief
under Title VII.45
Many scholars have argued that the term “sexual orientation” need not be
included in the language of Title VII for an allegation wholly based on sexual
“stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about
heterosexuality and homosexuality.” Id. (quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218).
39 Id. at 764 (quoting Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218).
40 Id. at 767 (Lawson, J., dissenting). Judge Lawson, a District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sat on the panel by designation.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 769.
44 Id. at 766.
45 Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
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preference to successfully overcome motions for summary judgment at trial.46
L. Camile Hebért, in Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights,
argued that “the term ‘sex’ should be defined more broadly than courts have
seen fit to do with respect to sexual minorities” to expand protections based not
solely on biological status, but also based on gender-linked traits including
contextual associations with avowedly LGBT organizations.47 While the
overwhelming trend among lower courts is to recognize a claim of sex
discrimination based on a lack of conformity to gender norms, such as a male
plaintiff’s effeminacy48 or a female’s tomboyish appearance,49 lower courts
remain largely confused about where to draw the line between claims based on
orientation and those based on gender nonconformity.50
In contrast to the lack of reception to mixed-motive claims of
discrimination based on sex where lesbian, gay, and bisexual identification
may be implicated, courts are traditionally more receptive to claims of
sex-based harassment or discrimination against transsexual or transgender
persons.51 Notably, other plaintiffs have sought redress outside the scope of
Title VII, looking to theories on the basis of privacy rights, due process, free
speech, and equal protection for recourse.52 Conspicuously in Lawrence v.
Texas, the Supreme Court held the application of a Texas statute that
criminalized sodomy, when engaged in by persons of the same-sex, to two
avowedly gay persons for sexual conduct within the confines of their private

46 See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713 (2010) (arguing that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
based on sex should protect gays and lesbians from discrimination and provide reasonable accommodations).
47 L. Camile Hebért, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 535, 589–90 (2009).
48 See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing summary
judgment for the defendant–employer because the plaintiff–employee’s “gender stereotyping claim” was
cognizable even though “it [was] possible that the harassment . . . was because of his sexual orientation, not his
effeminacy”).
49 See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., LLC, 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–43 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that the plaintiff presented “sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case” of sex discrimination where the
record established an employer discriminated against women because they did not wear dresses or makeup).
50 See, e.g., supra notes 30–45 (discussing Vickers).
51 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ex discrimination includes
discrimination against transgender persons because of their failure to comply with stereotypical gender
norms.” (emphasis added)); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding cognizable the
Title VII claim of a transsexual who alleged that she was the victim of discrimination due to her failure to
conduct herself in conformity with her employer’s sex stereotypes of how a man should behave).
52 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the private sexual practices of two gay men,
prosecuted under a Texas statute that criminalized persons of the same sex from engaging in sodomy, were
entitled to respect).
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home violated their rights to equal protection and due process.53 According to
the majority opinion, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protected the rights of gays to engage in intimate conduct within their homes
without suffering criminal sanctions.54 Some gays and lesbians have based
their claims successfully on various state constitutions. In Gay Law Students
Ass’n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Supreme Court of California
held that an employment discrimination claim is cognizable under the Equal
Protection Clause of the California constitution.55 Finally, due in part to the
lack of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the topic, and in the interest of
providing clarity in regards to discrimination faced by sexual minorities, many
states have adopted civil rights legislation expressly covering sexual
orientation.56
However, critics of statutory expansion have challenged the viability of
including sexual orientation as a protected class due to its fluid nature,
definitional obstacles, and similar evidentiary questions of establishing a
claim.57 In the absence of federal employment nondiscrimination protection for
gays and lesbians,58 and as sexual minorities increasingly form public
coalitions within the workplace,59 courts are left to grapple with the
53 Id. at 578–79 (“[I]ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))).
54 Id. at 567 (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”).
55 595 P.2d 592, 602 (Cal. 1979).
56 See Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a
Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1671 n.98 (2006) (“According to the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, 47% of the U.S. population lives in jurisdictions that have adopted nondiscrimination laws.”).
57 Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646 (2001); see also, e.g.,
Edward Stein, Conclusion: The Essentials of Constructionism and the Construction of Essentialism, in FORMS
OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 325, 326 (Edward Stein
ed., 1990) (“Essentialists think that being a heterosexual or homosexual is like having a certain blood
type . . . .”); Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights
Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 942 (1998) (“Arguments for suspect classification status for
sexual orientation based on immutability have been almost completely rejected.”).
58 See generally Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/lawsand-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-discrimination-act (last updated Dec. 18, 2014) (providing
that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act would mark a dramatic expansion of protections for gays and
lesbians at the federal level).
59 See Nathan Cullen, Out at Work: Diversity in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries,
MINORITYNURSE (Mar. 30, 2013), http://minoritynurse.com/out-at-work-diversity-in-the-pharmaceutical-andbiotechnology-industries/ (“[T]he workforce diversity [companies] they embrace not only encompasses race,
gender and disability status, but also has been expanded to include lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(LGBT) employees.”).
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conventional process of defining the scope of gender nonconformity. Just
where courts draw the line between discrimination based on sex and sexual
orientation remains a blurry exercise of judicial discretion.
B. The Sociological Approach: Achieving Masculinity Through Sexuality
This section explores the sociological approach to examining gender in a
contemporary context as a means of, ultimately, supporting a more
sociologically informed interpretation of sex, and what constitutes
discrimination based on sex, within Title VII jurisprudence. Sociological
scholarship provides much insight into how laypersons working in American
industry view and work collectively to construct gender norms. Here, this
Comment surveys the work of notable sociologists, examines the sociological
consensus regarding the distinction between sex and gender, and uses
sociological science to shed light on the role sexual orientation plays in the
societal construction of gender in modern hegemonic contexts.
Sociologists’ definition of sex differs from the modern jurisprudential
definition under Title VII. Historically, sociologists draw sharp distinctions
between concepts of sex and gender, largely relegating sex to notions of
genetic predispositions and phenotypic trends in human biology.60 While many
argue that sex, like gender, falls on a spectrum that recognizes wide biological
variation, most also recognize the predominance of two sex categories and
utilize terms “male” and “female” in discussing biological differences between
human sex organs.61 Moreover, Cecilia L. Ridgeway and Shelley J. Correll, in
Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs
and Social Relations, argue that people use relative “cultural beliefs about
gender” as the “rules” of evaluating others and classifying them into sexual
categories: “The process that links gender beliefs and social relational contexts
is automatic sex categorization. Sex categorization is the sociocognitive
process by which we label another as male or female. As we sex categorize

60 See, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (positing that “[a]s most
feminist theorists use the terminology, ‘sex’ refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between
men and women; ‘gender,’ by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay” on these distinctions); Penelope
Eckert, The Whole Woman: Sex and Gender Differences in Variation, 1 LANGUAGE VARIATION & CHANGE
245, 246 (1989) (“[S]ex is a biological category that serves as a fundamental basis for the differentiation of
roles, norms, and expectations . . . . that constitute gender, the social construction of sex.”).
61 Eckert, supra note 60, at 245 (“Sociolinguists generally treat sex in terms of oppositional categories
(male/female) . . . .”).
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another, by implication, we sex categorize ourselves as either similar or
different from that other.”62
Furthermore, while “physical sex differences” are presumed to be the
dividing characteristics used in the process of sex classification, “in everyday
social relational contexts, we sex categorize others based on appearance and
behavioral cues (e.g., dress, hairstyles, voice tone) that are culturally presumed
to stand for physical sex differences.”63 Thus, in the view of many sociologists,
the process of sex classification depends, in large part, on “widely shared
cultural beliefs about sex/gender” that are used selectively to “construct [one’s]
appearance” in such a way as to be deemed to “belong[] to the sex category
[one] claim[s] for [oneself].”64
To many social scientists, gender beliefs—although relative to the context
of any individual—“are always implicitly available to shape individuals’
evaluations and behavior.”65 While there is “no pattern of masculinity found
everywhere,”66 in many contexts and cultures, behavioral cues signifying sex
(and gender) classifications include and, in part, depend on outward
expressions of sexuality, nominally heterosexuality. R.W. Connell, in Teaching
the Boys: New Research on Masculinity, and Gender Strategies for Schools,
examines the role gender expression plays for young men in the context of
primary education.67 According to Connell, in most cultural contexts
“hegemonic masculinity” controls the parameters of gender expression for
males seeking to identify as men.68 While other forms of masculinity may exist
“alongside,” hegemonic masculinity “signifies a position of cultural authority
and leadership” and “is an expression of the privilege men collectively have
over women.”69 Such privilege is maintained collectively through adherence to
behavioral norms:
The gender structures of a society define particular patterns of
conduct as “masculine” and others as “feminine.” At one level, these
62 Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective
on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510, 514 (2004).
63 Id. at 515.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 R.W. Connell, Teaching the Boys: New Research on Masculinity, and Gender Strategies for Schools,
98 TCHRS C. REC. 206, 208 (1996).
67 Id. at 213 (“[G]ender is embedded in the institutional arrangements through which a school
functions . . . .”).
68 Id. at 209 (emphasis omitted).
69 Id.

PEEBLES GALLEYSPROOFS2

924

2/19/2015 12:41 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:911

patterns characterize individuals. Thus we say that a particular man
(or woman) is masculine, or behaves in a masculine way. But these
patterns also exist at the collective level. Masculinities are defined
and sustained in institutions, such as corporations, armies,
governments—or schools.70

Masculinity is an active process supported collectively as a result of conscious
choices on the part of actors.71 “Ethnomethodological research has shown that
we ‘do gender’ in everyday life,” from how we engage in conversations to our
criminal conduct in an attempt to “produce what [we] believe to be appropriate
masculinities.”72
In many contexts, including Western primary educational settings,
heterosexuality itself plays an important role in sustaining hegemonic
masculinity and, as a result, concepts of gender roles for men and women.73 In
Connell’s study of the primary school context, he writes “[a] heterosexual
construction of masculine and feminine as opposites (as in ‘the opposite sex,’
‘opposites attract’) runs through a great deal of the school’s . . . culture and
curriculum.”74 Although the homosexual experience is generally “blanked out”
from the official curriculum, informal forms of “hostility” work to reinforce
“powerful ideolog[ies] of gender difference” and “put pressure on boys [and
girls] to conform to it.”75
C. The Impact of Windsor: New Calls for Equality
This section explores recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as a means of
supporting the use and defense of an expansive interpretation of what
constitutes discrimination based on sex that recognizes sexuality as a pivotal
form of gender expression within the contemporary workplace. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized the right of gays and lesbians, at least within
the confines of the private home, to engage in sexual conduct based on
constitutionally protected liberty, the Court has yet to firmly ground
protections for sexual minorities in either Equal Protection or Due Process
jurisprudence.76

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Id. at 210 (“[M]asculinities come into existence as people act.”).
Id.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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However, much has yet to be said as to the impact of the Court’s decision
in United States v. Windsor.77 In striking down Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act78 (DOMA) and its sweeping prohibition on recognizing same-sex
unions for all federal purposes, the Court struggled to establish the
constitutional foundation for its reasoning.79 While the Court recognized its
history of deference to states with respect to issues of domestic relations,
recognizing “[t]he definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s
broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to
the ‘protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital
responsibilities,’”80 the Court ultimately grounded its decision in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.81 Paying respect to the class of
persons New York State sought to protect, the Court emphasized the “over
1,000 federal statutes and a myriad of federal regulations” from which DOMA
denied New York’s same-sex couples access.82 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, found as follows:
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those
persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal
statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.83

Notably, the Court left open the possibility of higher scrutiny for sexual
minorities as a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, finding “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.”84
The Court thus failed to establish sexual minorities as such a suspect class,
subject to higher scrutiny, or provide guidance as to how to apply Equal
Protection analysis to gays and lesbians. Importantly, however, the Court
77

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
79 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (suggesting gays and lesbians, or persons subject to discrimination “of
an unusual character,” deserve a form of heightened scrutiny (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80 Id. at 2691 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
81 Id. at 2693–96.
82 Id. at 2688.
83 Id. at 2696.
84 Id. at 2693 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
78
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added—for the first time—that “[i]n determining whether a law is motived by
an improper animus or purpose, ‘discriminations of an unusual character’
especially require careful consideration.”85 In light of the Court’s ambiguous
language in Windsor, LGBT litigants undoubtedly may find success in
grounding future claims of workplace discrimination and harassment in both
Equal Protection and Due Process jurisprudence.
II. AN INTERPRETIVE SOLUTION
This Part attempts to provide a concrete solution to the interpretive
disconnect between current sociological and jurisprudential approaches to
examining gender within a Title VII context. First, section A offers an
expansive interpretation of “sex,” which not only encompasses biological
distinctions and outward expression of gendered dress but also sexual
orientation, associations with LGBT persons, or perceived sexual identity in
modern workplaces where hegemonic masculinity sets the standard for the
achievement of gender. Second, section B both examines failed attempts to
expand protections for sexual minorities through the legislative process and
questions the feasibility of such statutory proposals in light of current, broad
interpretations of sex.
A. A Brave New World: Expansive Interpretations in an Era of Equal Justice
This section first explores the contrast between jurisprudential
interpretations of what constitutes discrimination based on “sex” within
Title VII’s class-based scheme and the sociological realities surrounding the
construction of gender as a means of personal and homosocial expression.
Second, this section proposes a new, expansive interpretation of what
constitutes discrimination based on sex that includes conduct, although
avowedly homosexual in nature, which fails to conform to hegemonic notions
of gender and identity. Finally, this section confronts the concerns of critics
and examines the benefits to judicial efficiency and workplace equity that
result from interpretively expanding Title VII’s protections.
85 Id. at 2693 (emphasis added) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)); see, e.g., Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (permitting the Boy Scouts of America’s exclusion of a gay
individual as an assistant scoutmaster based only upon its First Amendment freedoms of expressive
association); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (“If the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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Given the growing body of jurisprudence recognizing the constitutional
rights of sexual minorities86 and the expansive body of sociological evidence
emphasizing sexuality’s role in social constructions of gender,87 the time is
ripe for courts to read Title VII expansively to more accurately protect
individuals discriminated against “because of” gender nonconformity. In his
work, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, Michael Kimmel notes that conceptions of
gender lack universal equality and should be examined within the context in
which they manifest themselves.88 “All masculinities are not created equal; or
rather, we are all created equal, but any hypothetical equality evaporates
quickly because our definitions of masculinity are not equally valued in our
society.”89 Pulling from Erving Goffman’s conception of “hegemonic”
masculinity, Kimmel notes that, traditionally, there has been only “one
complete, unblushing male” seeking to achieve manhood:
a young, married, white, urban, northern heterosexual, Protestant
father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion,
weight and height, and a recent record in sports. Every American
male tends to look out upon the world from this perspective. . . . Any
male who fails to qualify in any one of these ways is likely to view
himself . . . as unworthy, incomplete, and inferior.90

Ultimately, Kimmel views hegemonic masculinity as a three-tiered process
within the modern American context: (1) the “flight from the feminine” (not
being a woman),91 (2) the “homosocial enactment,”92 and (3) the embodiment
of homophobia—the “central organizing principle of our cultural definition of
manhood.”93 Homophobia, according to Kimmel, “is more than an irrational

86

See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of
Gender Identity, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 119 (Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman eds., 1994).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 124.
90 Id. at 125 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, SITGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
128 (1963)).
91 Id. at 126–28 (noting the first step in achieving masculinity has “[h]istorically” been “the flight from
women,” which has severe consequences for young boys: first, the pushing away of ones “real mother, and
with her the traits of nurturance, compassion, and tenderness she may have embodied;” second, the
suppression of “those traits in himself;” and third, learning “to devalue all women in . . . society”).
92 Id. at 128–29 (finding that because “[o]ther men watch us, rank us, [and] grant our acceptance into the
realm of manhood,” men “perform heroic feats” and “take enormous risks” in an attempt to seek the approval
of other men).
93 Id. at 131.
87
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fear of” homosexuals or conduct that may “be perceived as gay.”94 Rather, it is
the manifestation of a fear that “other men” will “emasculate” or “reveal
to . . . the world that [such males] do not measure up.”95 This fear of being
viewed by others “as a sissy,” the equating of all things homosexual with
femininity, and the “humiliation” of being afraid, “leads to silence” in the face
of demonstrations of violence toward sexual minorities.96
In fact, because “efforts to maintain a manly front cover everything [men]
do,” and because “[e]very mannerism . . . contains a coded gender[ed]
language,”97 people use gendered codes to “know” whether a person,
nominally a male, is homosexual.98 As a result, “[h]omophobia and sexism go
hand in hand,” as heterosexual (and closeted homosexual) men adopt “negative
rules about behavior”—they never “dress that way,” “talk or walk that way,”
or “show their feelings or get emotional”—and “exaggerat[e] all the traditional
rules of masculinity, including sexual predation with women.”99 Thus,
according to Kimmel, sex-based discrimination and harassment, the very
tradition and conduct Title VII seeks to upend, stems in part from hegemonic
masculinity and homophobia.100 Women and gay men are sociologically
linked; they “become the ‘other’ against which heterosexual men project their
identities.”101 Likewise, lesbians threaten concepts of hegemonic masculinity
by filling and blocking heterosexual males from their traditionally held role:
the objects of a female’s intimate and sexual affection.102 If Kimmel’s work is
worthy of credence, in a modern context that incorporates such hegemonic
constructions of gender and social customs, overtly and avowedly homosexual

94

Id.
Id.
96 Id.; see also id. at 134 (“Gay men have historically played the role of the consummate sissy in the
American popular mind because homosexuality is seen as an inversion of normal gender development.”). In
his work, Kimmel focuses on the man’s experience in an attempt to highlight hegemony’s focus on man’s
dominance, and resultant privilege gained, over woman in the construction of gender norms. See id.
97 Id. at 132.
98 Id. at 132–33. Kimmel notes many female subjects, when asked how to identify a man as homosexual,
point to a man “show[ing] his feelings,” acting “a certain way,” and “really car[ing] about [women].” Id.
99 Id. at 133.
100 See id. (“Homophobia is intimately interwoven with both sexism and racism.”). The fear that others
might perceive men as homosexual “propels men to enact all manner of exaggerated masculine behaviors and
attitudes to make sure no one could possibly get the wrong idea.” Id.
101 See id. at 134.
102 See James Joseph Dean, Heterosexual Masculinities, Anti-Homophobias, and Shifts in Hegemonic
Masculinities: The Identity Practices of Black and White Heterosexual Men, 54 SOC. Q. 534, 546 (2013)
(noting although animus is stronger toward gay men than toward lesbians, in many cases where lesbianism is
tolerated, it “is coupled with a homophobic practice that views lesbians as sexual objects for straight men”).
95
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conduct and expression must fall squarely within the scope of Title VII’s
“sex.”
“Sex,” in no uncertain terms, must be read expansively. Given existing
jurisprudence, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex should (or rather,
does) encompass and protect against, among other things, the following:
discrimination based on biological and phenotypic characteristics;103 outward
and expressive mannerisms (whether exhibited within the workplace or not)
that fail to meet expectations of gendered behavior; associations and
allegiances with known openly gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer, or
questioning persons; assertive conduct (such as wearing an armband signifying
support for LGBT persons); and actual or perceived LGBT identity itself, in
those situations wherein a court determines hegemonic masculinity sets the
standard for the achievement of gender. Of course, this burden would fall—as
it does with any Title VII claim of discrimination—on the plaintiff, who must
be given the opportunity to present the relevant data and social science to
establish the pervasiveness of hegemonic conceptualizations and expectations
of gender. Likewise, while courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have more
readily welcomed claims by transgender plaintiffs based solely on their
“transgender” identity into Title VII’s fold,104 gay, lesbian, and bisexual
plaintiffs (whether actual, perceived, or linked through associations) should not
be precluded from a judicial opinion recognizing homosexuality as a marker of
femininity (or failure to achieve gender norms) for men—and masculinity for
women—in hegemonic contexts.
Critics of expansive, albeit more realistic, interpretations of what
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex point to a number of flawed
notions for support: the lack of “sexual orientation” as a protected class within
the Act; the lack of necessity for expansive interpretations, given state and
local antidiscrimination laws that have provided “51 percent of gay workers

103 See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-15331PHX-SRB, 2004 WL
2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (“[N]either a woman with male genitalia nor a man with stereotypically
female anatomy, such as breasts, may be deprived of a benefit or privilege of employment by reason of that
nonconforming trait.”).
104 See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ex discrimination includes
discrimination against transgender persons because of their failure to comply with stereotypical gender
norms.” (emphasis added)). Although the Glenn court held an employer’s termination of a transgender
person’s employment based on the view “a male in women’s clothing is ‘unnatural’” was discrimination based
on sex, it left open the relationship of sexual orientation with gender norms. Id. at 1314.
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with protection against discrimination;”105 alternatively, to the potential for a
“flood” of litigation, should courts broaden Title VII’s scope;106 and the
pragmatic problems of defining the class or identifying conduct or symbolism
avowedly homosexual in nature.107 Such challengers overstate their position,
failing to respect the purposes of Title VII,108 the role gender plays in identity
expression for gays and lesbians, and the significance placed on sexuality as a
marker of gender nonconformity. Moreover, although difficult fact-specific
inquiries into the bases of discrimination may be dramatically difficult in cases
involving actual or perceived LGBT plaintiffs, such inquiry cannot excuse
courts from the duty to uphold Title VII’s prohibition on workplace
discrimination based on gender nonconformity—regardless of the particular
nonconforming conduct alleged.
Such criticisms expressly fail on five counts. First, utilizing the substantive
canon of statutory construction of avoiding absurd results, many courts have
found statutes encompass activity and entities beyond the scope of an
enumerated list or class of persons to evade a result clearly contrary to
Congress’s intent.109 The extensive legislative history and public debate
105 JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION OF
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES: STATE NONDISCRIMINATION POLICIES FILL THE VOID BUT FEDERAL
PROTECTIONS ARE STILL NEEDED 15 (2012), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/
2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf.
106 Id. at 15–16 (noting there is neither a threat of a “flood” nor “drought” of litigation because “the rate of
complaints on the basis of sexual orientation is in line with those on the basis of sex and race” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
107 See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257–58 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the
slurs, mockery regarding the plaintiff’s same-sex sexual conduct, and use of “high-pitched voices” and
“stereotypically feminine” gestures were not actionable because the plaintiff failed to articulate a
discrimination claim “based on sex”). But see Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409–10 (D. Mass. 2002)
(holding plaintiffs need not claim discrimination based on sex “alone or that sexual orientation played no part
in his [or her] treatment” because, if he or she can show he or she was discriminated against because of sex “as
a result of sex stereotyping, the fact that he was also discriminated against on the basis of his sexual orientation
has no legal significance”).
108 See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[I]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex . . . Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109 See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (finding, in many
contexts, a court is not bound by the plain meaning of a statue because “a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because [it is] not within its spirit”). Looking to “the whole legislation, or
[to] the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow” from interpreting
statutory language in a certain way is “not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator.”
Id.; see also Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (holding a petitioner’s requested limitation on
the scope of a statute invalid because “it is not, and cannot be, [the Court’s] practice to restrict the unqualified
language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy—even assuming that it is
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surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, coupled with nearly
fifty years of its application in federal courts, suggest the Act’s protected
classes were carefully considered and strategically limited. However, given the
judiciary’s Article III duty to apply law to specific and, perhaps, unforeseen
scenarios,110 and overwhelming social science recognizing heterosexuality as
an essential pillar of achieving gender in modern contexts,111 it is well within
the Court’s constitutional power (and, indeed, duty) to view avowedly
homosexual expression and association as falling within its conception of
gender nonconformity in sex-stereotyping discrimination claims under
Title VII. Thus, the mere fact that “sexual orientation” was not written into the
Act in 1964, or as amended on subsequent occasions, should not bar the most
expansive reading of “sex” possible—one that fathoms situations wherein an
employee’s sexual orientation itself could prevent the achievement of societal
gendered expectations.
Second, many scholars have shown state and local antidiscrimination laws,
while valuable assets in curbing severe and pervasive conduct against sexual
minorities, are often misapplied and leave roughly half of LGBT workers
nationwide without recourse.112 Currently, only twenty-one states include
protections for gays and lesbians facing workplace animus.113
Third, concerns regarding any hypothetical rush to the courthouse also fail
to hold water. Nan D. Hunter, in Sexuality and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining
Anti-Discrimination Laws, examined early studies on the use of state and local

possible to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute itself”). But see Robbins v.
Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the burden required under the absurdity doctrine is
high, and “[i]t is not enough to show . . . the result is contrary to what Congress . . . desired”). Courts apply the
doctrine “only when it would have been unthinkable for Congress to have intended the result commanded by
the words of the statute,” where “the result would be ‘so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.’” Id.
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190–91 (1992)).
110 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of
Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89, 90–93 (1991) (recognizing the success of the gay rights
movement in finding protections through dynamic statutory interpretation); Heidi A. Sorensen, Note, A New
Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. L.J.
2105, 2108–09 (1993) (noting “dynamic statutory interpretation recognizes that language and legislative
history may both be unclear” and “asks what the statute should mean in relationship to contemporary society”).
111 Kimmel, supra note 87, at 124–25.
112 See Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining Anti-Discrimination Laws, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 565, 572 (2000) (recognizing state and local antidiscrimination laws are ineffective for a
number of reasons, including lack of “public awareness,” “the nature of the administrative process,” and the
complex web of interrelating protections).
113 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, supra note 58.
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antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual minorities.114 Pointing to two
comprehensive studies conducted by the then-named General Accounting
Office, at the request of Senator James M. Jeffords,115 Hunter noted, “Both
reports found that the absolute number of complaints of sexual orientation filed
in each state was small, ranging from a low of two per year in smaller states to
a high of 173 during one year in California.”116 Although the studies revealed
considerable variation among states, “possible demographic factors, major
differences in enforcement regimes,” and “the structure of state and local
antidiscrimination laws, as compared to federal law” may work to explain any
differences in statistical reporting of claims based on race and those based on
sexual orientation.117 Thus, given the preponderance of evidence suggesting, at
most, a minimal variation in the rates of complaint by members of various
protected classes within state and local laws, claims that broadening the scope
of sex-stereotyping discrimination would dramatically frustrate judicial
efficiency need not deter such a dynamic interpretation.
The fourth reason such criticism of a broad interpretation of what
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex fails is that challenges in class
definition, although significant, are ultimately surmountable. At the outset, it is
important to acknowledge that the fact-specific task of identifying particular
contexts in which sexual nonconformity exposes “members of one sex . . . to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed”118 or in defining the class of persons who qualify as
a sexual minority, who fail to meet societal norms of gendered behavior, can
present unique obstacles. However, some suggest related concerns are
exaggerated in the debate revolving around LGBT rights. Approaching the
challenges of identifying and classifying LGBT persons within the context of
Equal Protection analysis, in Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” Kenji Yoshino
114

Hunter, supra note 112, at 570–72.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OGC-00-27R, SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: STATES’ EXPERIENCE WITH STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS SINCE 1997 (2000), available at
GAO/OGC-98-7R,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/90269.pdf;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SEXUAL-ORIENTATION-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STATES’ EXPERIENCE WITH STATUTORY
PROHIBITIONS (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/87121.pdf. The Office’s name was changed
to the Government Accountability Office in 2004. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-271, § 8, 118 Stat. 811, 814.
116 Hunter, supra note 112, at 570.
117 Id. at 571.
118 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
115
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argues that courts have erroneously placed heightened significance and
privilege in the hands of “talismanic classifications,” like race, which
“ostensibly mark individuals with immutable and visible traits.”119 In
determining whether a group is entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court has
employed a set of nonessential factors, including “the history of discrimination
suffered by the group, the group’s political powerlessness, and the
immutability and visibility of the characteristic defining the group.”120 While
Yoshino seems to cabin his argument to individuals who identify as a sexual
minority, distinct from sex-based classifications, he pinpoints legitimate
challenges in identifying sexual minorities and (in this case) LGBT-related
conduct or associations that, in a given workplace, may constitute gender
nonconformity protected under Title VII’s “sex.”121
Yoshino counters critics of expanding protections for sexual minorities and
seems to suggest sexuality need not be limited to mere mannerisms or
performance of sexual acts, arguing emphasis on visibility and immutability
work an “assimilationist bias” on indistinct classes of persons.122 Arguing that
courts have failed to accurately recognize “social visibility,” which “designates
perceptibility of non-physical traits,” Yoshino notes that “[w]hether a trait is
visible will thus depend not only on the trait, but also on the ‘decoding
capacity of the audience,’ which in turn will depend on the social context.”123
Failure to recognize the realities of workplace gender norms (which oftentimes
include public maintenance of heterosexuality) or conduct beyond mannerisms
and dress “freez[es] out”124 a substantial segment of gender nonconforming
employees and encourages “converting, passing, and covering.”125
Moreover, such a challenge rings hollow because visibility and
immutability, where proper, are used in controversies surrounding the borders
of the class of persons itself. Here, this Comment does not argue for an
expansion of “sex” to include “sexual orientation” in all contexts. Indeed, the
119 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 487 (1998).
120 Id. at 489.
121 See id. at 502–03.
122 Id. at 490 (“Through these factors, the jurisprudence creates an incentive for indistinct groups to
assimilate into the political mainstream when faced with burdensome legislation.”).
123 Id. at 497–98 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting GOFFMAN, supra note 90, at 51); see also
id. at 498 (“Visibility, like immutability, is therefore always socially determined.”).
124 Id. at 499.
125 Id. at 500 (“Converting bias means that a group is asked to change the trait that defines it. . . . Passing
means that a group is forced to hide its identity. . . . Covering means that a group is permitted to both retain
and articulate its identity as long as it mutes the difference between itself and the mainstream.”).
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focus should remain on situations and contexts where identification as gay or
lesbian, or even allegiances with avowedly LGBT persons or organizations,
may constitute protected gender nonconforming conduct. Certainly, an openly
gay employee subject to an adverse employment action at an LGBT nightclub
cannot claim that, within this context, he or she failed to conform to workplace
gender expectations due to his or her sexual preferences. However, as in any
sex-stereotyping case, courts must examine “how society perceives the
individual” to determine the bases of adverse treatment.126 Likewise, this
Comment posits that—for the sake of protecting all persons subject to unlawful
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity—courts take off the
blinders of visibility from Equal Protection analysis and adopt a realistic scope
of gender nonconforming conduct (i.e., take into account sexuality’s role as a
marker of difference in most contexts).
Finally, critics of an expansive interpretation fail to dispel overwhelming
evidence suggesting judicial freedom to identify gays and lesbians, or conduct
affiliated with the LGBT community, as gender nonconforming, would
expedite the judiciary’s task of defining the scope of Title VII. District courts
have exemplified this struggle to draw a line between discrimination because
of sex and that based solely on sexual orientation in the absence of clarity.127
For example, in hostile environment sexual harassment claims involving
same-sex harassers, courts expend much energy ensuring harassment is related
to sex, rather than sexual orientation.128 In Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc.,
where an employee alleged supervisors would grab his genitals or buttocks and
refer to him by using slurs, the court found the harassment claim actionable
under Title VII, noting nothing in Title VII itself limits its protection to
“heterosexual harassment.”129
However, in sex-stereotyping cases, many courts have limited plaintiffs’
ability to bring a Title VII claim on the basis of gender nonconformity. In Oiler
v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., the district court held that “wearing female
126

Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006).
See id. at 210 (“To the extent that Title VII . . . prohibits sex stereotyping alone, it does so to allow
women . . . to express their individual female identities without being punished for being ‘macho,’ or for men
to express their individual male identities without reprisal for being perceived as effeminate. In other words, it
creates space for people of both sexes to express their sexual identity in nonconforming ways.”).
128 See Peric v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., No. 96 C 2354, 1997 WL 112819, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10,
1997) (drawing a distinction between harassment based on identification as gay or lesbian with identification
as a man or woman).
129 Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
1995).
127
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clothing and accessories” was not protected, gender nonconforming conduct
under Title VII because it occurred while “not at work.”130 Moreover, the
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination because he failed
to show any similarly situated woman “was a crossdresser.”131
Such a burden of proof misses the point of Title VII’s prohibition on sex
stereotyping, too quickly dismissing the unique, contextual significance of
wearing a dress within both male and female homosocial relations.132 Other
district courts take a more lenient approach, refusing to bar a Title VII claim of
discrimination based on sexual orientation so long as sex is also articulated as a
basis.133 Finally, some courts refuse to recognize sex-stereotyping arguments
when the “homosexuality of a harasser provides an inference of sexual desire
for a victim of the same sex.”134 Ultimately, until the Court definitively erases
the line so as to encompass the reality that homosexual identity often fails
gender expectations, lower courts will continue to create and navigate through
their uncertain mirage of self-imposed limitations.
B. Examining Alternative Approaches: A Statutory Fix?
In the wake of such uncertainty for LGBT claimants seeking recompense
through the judicial process, many have argued, instead, for Congressional
reforms.135 First, this section examines the history of legislative failures to
130

Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2002); see also id. at *7 (“[I]n order for a plaintiff to show disparate treatment, she must demonstrate that the
misconduct for which she was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by a[n] employee [not within
her protected class] whom [the company] retained.” (alterations in original) (quoting Wallace v. Methodist
Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131 Id. at *8.
132 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2547 (1994) (“[D]ress and appearance expectations
subordinate women to men. For example, women’s dress and appearance demands are much more complex
than men’s, involving . . . more time and effort to assemble . . . . Women’s standards are harder to attain than
men’s and matter more.”). A female engaging in the exact conduct alleged would likely remain employed due
to the lessened burden of adopting and greater social acceptance of men’s attire in hegemonic work
environments.
133 Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (D. Mass. 2002).
134 Ellsworth v. Pot Luck Enters., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
135 See, e.g., MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN & CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, A BROKEN BARGAIN: DISCRIMINATION, FEWER BENEFITS AND MORE TAXES FOR LGBT WORKERS
95, 110 (2013), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/a-broken-bargain-full-report.pdf (providing support for the
notion that antiquated and discriminatory laws make it harder for LGBT workers to provide for themselves and
their families while suggesting “federal law . . . drives most of the inequities”); Press Release, Out & Equal
Workplace Advocates, Post-DOMA, Significantly More Lesbian and Gay Adults Wish to Avoid Jobs in States
where
Marriage
Equality
is
Absent
(Oct.
24,
2013),
available
at

PEEBLES GALLEYSPROOFS2

936

2/19/2015 12:41 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:911

enact an Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) to protect LGBT
persons from workplace discrimination. Second, this section examines the
actions and political struggles faced by the 113th Congress in enacting such
legislation. Finally, this section asks, given the broad and seemingly expanding
scope of what is considered to be sexual discrimination in Title VII
jurisprudence since Price Waterhouse,136 what distinguishes the proposed
legislation with current judicial interpretations of Title VII.
In 1998, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 13,087, “prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation in the federal civilian workforce.”137
This, however, followed DOMA, which President Clinton signed into law in
1996,138 the same year that the first floor vote on a proposed ENDA bill was
rejected by a vote of fifty to forty-nine in the Senate.139 Perhaps acting on the
momentum of this and four subsequent ENDA bills that each saw their demise
in committee or on the floor of Congress,140 in 2007, Representatives Barney
Frank, Chris Shays, Tammy Baldwin, and Deborah Pryce, with numerous
other cosponsors, introduced H.R. 2015,141 which included for the first time
“gender identity” and “sexual orientation” within the scope of federal
employment protections.142 Although the bill’s cosponsors had hoped to sweep
transgendered, gay, and lesbian plaintiffs into the fold of federal civil rights
statutory law unambiguously, the House Education and Labor Committee
opted for and favorably reported143 a version of the bill that included only

http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/2013%20Out%20Equal%20Workplace%20Survey%20Release%201024-2013.pdf (reporting that a Harris Poll commissioned by a nonprofit organization found that “nearly eight of
ten (76%) adults wrongly think it is currently illegal, under federal law, for an employer to fire someone
because they are gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender”).
136 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
137 See Jackie Gardina, Executive Orders: Term-Limited Victories, HUFFPOST GAY VOICES (Sept. 22,
2014, 5:59 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jackie-gardina/executive-orders-termlimi_b_
5604023.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998).
138 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
139 Employment
Non-Discrimination Act: Legislative Timeline, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act-legislative-timeline
(last
visited
Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter ENDA: Legislative Timeline].
140 Id. (exempting discrimination in the armed services).
141 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong.
142 Id. § 4(a).
143 H.R. REP. NO. 110-406, pt. 1, at 10 (2007) (confirming the bill prohibits discrimination, by employers
of fifteen or more persons, “on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation”). The Report acknowledged
Title VII and noted the bill would “ensure that in the same tradition of this country’s civil rights laws, the
fundamental principles of fairness and equality at work w[ould] be protected regardless of an individual’s
sexual orientation.” Id. at 11.
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sexual orientation.144 While the House version of the bill passed by a vote of
235 to 184, the Senate failed to take a formal vote, and the bill ultimately
died.145
In 2009, Representative Frank acted again, proposing the expansive
H.R. 3017,146 which once again included a ban on workplace discrimination
based on both “gender identity” and “sexual orientation.”147 And, although
Senator Jeff Merkley introduced a comparable ENDA bill in August 2009,
with bipartisan support in the Senate,148 neither bill received committee
approval.149 Since these initial forays into expanding employment protections
for LGBT persons expressly through the legislative process, four additional
bills have been proposed with only one receiving a formal vote on the floor of
Senate in 2013.150
The latest such set of proposals, H.R. 1755 and S. 815, were proposed on
April 25, 2013, and garnered 206 cosponsors in the House and fifty-six
cosponsors in the Senate.151 After the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee favorably reported its bill,152 and after more than two
decades of fighting to pass employment protections for gays and lesbians, the
Senate approved its first bill by a 64–32 vote on November 7, 2013.153 The
House refused to vote on its own version of ENDA, effectively killing the
legislation, and hopes for its passage remain dim in the 114th Congress given
144

Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong.
ENDA: Legislative Timeline, supra note 139.
146 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong.
147 Id. § 4(a).
148 See Press Release, Merkley, Collins, Kennedy, Snowe Introduce Legislation to End Workplace
Discrimination, Sen. Jeff Merkley (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/merkley-collins-kennedy-snowe-introduce-legislation-to-end-workplace-discrimination.
149 See ENDA: Legislative Timeline, supra note 139 (asserting comparable ENDA bills were introduced in
both 2011 and 2013).
150 Id.
151 See Cosponsors: H.R.1755—113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1755/cosponsors; Cosponsors: S.815—113th Congress (2013-2014),
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/815/cosponsors (last visited Feb. 6,
2015).
152 See S. REP. NO. 113-105, at 5, 11 (2013) (providing that the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions adopted the bill, as amended, by a 15–7 vote, clarifying that “disparate impact claims [were] not
allowed under the Act; that a plaintiff [could not] recover for the same offense under both title VII and ENDA;
that it is sufficient for an employer to post an amended notice regarding antidiscrimination policy; . . . and that
in mixed motive cases, an employee only need establish that discrimination was a ‘motivating factor’ for the
adverse action”).
153 Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Approves Ban on Antigay Bias in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/us/politics/senate-moves-to-final-vote-on-workplace-gay-bias-ban.html.
145
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its growing conservative coalition154 and close resemblance to the 113th
Congress, which many scholars have suggested to be the most defunct and
incapable of political compromise since the American Civil War.155 Critics of
the latest Senate bill have argued it infringes on religious liberties by carving
out an all-too-narrow exemption for religious employers and institutions.156
Conversely, many LGBT-activist groups claim the bill failed to go far enough
to protect all workers, especially those employed by religious-affiliated
institutions that serve the public or provide entire regions with industry and
financial security.157 In light of sociological research and judicial precedent,
this Comment now explores the bill itself. Specifically, this section focuses on
explicit protections for claims based on “sexual orientation” and highlights the
wide and unchartered analytical overlap between expansive interpretations of
what is considered discrimination on the basis of sex in Title VII and the
uncertain scope of hypothetical claims under ENDA.
The text of the Senate bill itself essentially would grant the same
protections already enjoyed by workers bringing claims based on race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual,

154 E.g., Chris Johnson, House Panel Rejects Last-Ditch Effort to Pass ENDA, WASH. BLADE (Dec. 3,
2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/12/03/house-panel-rejects-last-ditch-panel-pass-enda/ (“Last
year, the Senate passed a version of ENDA on a bipartisan basis by a 64–32 vote, but the House never brought
up the measure for a vote and is set to adjourn by Dec. 11. It’s unlikely the bill will come up when Congress
reconvenes for the 114th Congress given major election wins by Republican on Election Day.”).
155 See Scott Neuman, Congress Really Is as Bad as You Think, Scholars Say, NPR (Dec. 27, 2011, 2:14
PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/27/144319863/congress-really-is-as-bad-as-you-think-scholars-say
(suggesting many historians, including Daniel Feller, a professor of U.S. history at the University of
Tennessee, believe “today’s Congress is the least effective since before the Civil War”).
156 See Shaun Kenney, Politifact on ENDA: “If You Like Your Religious Freedom, You Can Keep Your
Religious Freedom,” REDSTATE (Dec. 17, 2013, 2:04 PM), http://www.redstate.com/svkenney/2013/12/17/
politifact-on-enda-if-you-like-your-religious-freedom-you-can-keep-your-religious-freedom/ (suggesting that
many conservative organizations, including the Family Research Council, believe ENDA’s “exemption fails to
protect individual Christians, Jews, Muslims and others who have objections to certain sexual behaviors from
making employment decisions consistent with their faith”).
157 See Gregory R. Nevins, ENDA’s Religious Loophole, LAMDA LEGAL BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20131107_enda-religious-loophole (asserting the bill’s exemption would
allow a “religiously affiliated hospital, social welfare agency or private school . . . to refuse employment or fire
a nurse, janitor or social worker because the person is lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender,” which suggests
“LGBT discrimination is not as bad as other types of discrimination that we don’t let employers get away
with”).
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because of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or
gender identity; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees or
applicants for employment of the employer in any way that would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment or otherwise
adversely affect the status of the individual as an employee, because
of such individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity.158

Unlike Title VII, however, the Senate bill provides that claimants basing their
claims on sexual orientation or gender identity would be unable to establish
liability based on a theory of disparate impact,159 dramatically limiting the
scope of protections to either intentional individual disparate treatment or
systemic disparate treatment claims. In either case, the Senate bill would
require plaintiffs to establish—either through statistics, anecdotes, or a factual
prima facie case—intentional discrimination on the part of an employer or
agent.160
Like Title VII, and judicial precedent on Title VII’s standard of proof,161
the Senate bill provides both a mixed motive standard of proof162 and a
prohibition on retaliation.163 Moreover, in what would seem an apparent effort
to appease critics and those seeking to preserve religious liberty in the
workforce, the Senate bill also adopts Title VII’s religious exemption for
“religious employer[s].”164 Thus, contrary to LGBT-rights activists’ hopes,165
158

Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(a).
See id. § 4(g) (“Only disparate treatment claims may be brought under this Act.”).
160 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (providing a three-step
framework for establishing disparate treatment discrimination: the prima facie case, an employer’s opportunity
to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken, and an opportunity for the claimant to
show the proffered reason is pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of the protected class); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (establishing the disparate impact standard of proof
under Title VII where intent is not an essential element of the claim).
161 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (confirming that “when a plaintiff in a
Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,” liability is
established).
162 See S. 815 § 4(h) (“Except as otherwise provided, an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that sexual orientation or gender identity was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
163 Id. § 5.
164 Id. § 6(a).
165 See Weakened ENDA Means Less Protection for Everyone, LAMDA LEGAL, (Oct. 4, 2007),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ny_20071004_weekened-enda-means-less-protection
(“The
blanket
exemption for religious employers is broader than the exemptions on other civil rights laws and leaves many
workers with no legal protections.”). But see Peters, supra note 153 (noting that Sen. Dan Coats of Indiana, an
opponent of the bill, claimed “religious freedoms were at risk, despite the bill’s broad exemption for religious
institutions”).
159
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S. 815 would allow “a corporation, association, educational institution or
institution of learning, or society that is exempt from the religious
discrimination provisions of title VII” to take an employee’s sexual orientation
or gender identity into account in making any employment-related decision.166
Finally, the Senate bill exempts the “relationship between the United States
and members of the Armed Forces” from the definition of “employment,”167
and exempts the following from the purview of the act:
reasonable dress or grooming standards not prohibited by other
provisions of Federal, State, or local law, provided that the employer
permits any employee who has undergone gender transition prior to
the time of employment, and any employee who has notified the
employer that the employee has undergone or is undergoing gender
transition after the time of employment, to adhere to the same dress
or grooming standards as apply for the gender to which the employee
has transitioned or is transitioning.168

However, few scholars have yet to consider the bill’s definition of the
protected class itself and what implications its definition has on jurisprudential
readings of the term “sex” in Title VII. Section 3(a)(7) of the bill defines
“gender identity” as the “gender-related characteristics of an individual, with
or without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth,”169 and
Section 3(a)(10) defines “sexual orientation” to mean “homosexuality,
heterosexuality, or bisexuality.”170 The bill provides some clarity on
associational claims, much like those found in Vickers, where a plaintiff was
discriminated against merely based on his expressed association and friendship
with a known gay coworker.171 Section 4(e), if enacted, would protect against
actions “taken against an individual based on the actual or perceived sexual
orientation or gender identity of a person with whom the individual associates
or has associated.”172
166 S. 815 § 6(a). The bill, unlike Title VII, provides that “[a] religious employer’s exemption . . . shall not
result in any action by a Federal agency, or any State or local agency that receives Federal funding” to penalize
adverse employment decisions taken, providing arguably broader immunity for exempt organizations than
under Title VII. Id. § 6(b).
167 Id. § 7(a).
168 Id. § 8(a).
169 Id. § 3(a)(7).
170 Id. § 3(a)(10) (limiting sexuality to three distinct classifications rather than recognizing a spectrum of
sexual identity).
171 Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding discrimination on the
basis of association with an avowed homosexual was not a sufficient basis for a Title VII claim of sex
stereotyping discrimination).
172 S. 815 § 4(e) (emphasis added).
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However, in defining the class of persons via three analytically distinct
labels of personal sexual preference,173 requiring the identification of an
actually or perceived homosexual “person” with whom a claimant has formed
a relationship to succeed on an associational claim,174 and failing to clearly
define the scope of “other gender-related characteristics of an individual,”175
the bill leaves much unanswered. Would ENDA merely provide claimants
facing sex-stereotyping discrimination a second avenue of redress without
altering existing jurisprudence recognizing discrimination based on gender
nonconforming conduct? Would ENDA require a claimant self-identify as
homosexual to successfully bring a claim based on sexual orientation when he
or she expresses affinity for abstract groups, organizations, or perspectives that
welcome and affirm homosexuality? Does ENDA not also protect
heterosexuals whose “mannerisms” fail to meet gendered norms of workplace
conduct? And, if the scope of ENDA is, in fact, distinct from Title VII, what
metric does either statute leave the judiciary in drawing this quasi-transparent
line? Perhaps, ENDA—well intended as it may be—would frustrate and
darken the hues of gray already plaguing a bench, lethargic to draw lines or
make fact-intensive determinations regarding sociological norms of behavior.
The bill’s prospective solutions are ineffectual, vague, and—where
discernable—limited in scope. At first glance, the Senate bill’s “actual or
perceived” language would seem to expand the scope of workplace protections
beyond Title VII for those discriminated against because of gender
nonconforming conduct—including supporting abstract gay rights in a
hegemonic work environment—irrespective of one’s own sexual preference.176
Moreover, while “other gender-related characteristics” seems to directly
overlap with the Court’s interpretation of “sex” in Title VII, which includes
gender nonconforming conduct that falls short of stereotypes of gender
performance, it could be argued that S. 815 focuses principally on
“identity.”177 Even Section 4(e), which would seemingly sweep a broad class
of persons under its purview by prohibiting mere associational discrimination,

173 See, e.g., id. § 3(10) (limiting “sexual orientation” to homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality);
Vivienne C. Cass, Homosexual Identity: A Concept in Need of Definition, J. HOMOSEXUALITY, Apr. 1984, at
105, 107 (“The most noticeable feature of the literature on homosexual identity is an almost universal lack of
definition of the term ‘identity’ as it relates to the homosexual. . . . [H]undreds of scientific articles . . . refer to
homosexual identity without explaining what is meant by the concept.” (internal citations omitted)).
174 S. 815 § 4(e).
175 Id. § 3(a)(7).
176 Id. § 4(a)(1).
177 Id. § 3(a)(7).
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would require a showing that any action taken was “based on the actual or
perceived sexual orientation or a gender identity of a person with whom the
[plaintiff] associates.”178
Nonetheless, the bill’s definition of “gender identity” would seem to
directly protect conduct already safeguarded under Title VII.179 While its
textual definition first protects “gender-related identity,” Section 3(a)(7) also
includes “appearance” and “mannerisms” and “other gender-related
characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s
designated sex at birth”180 within the class. However, while this would seem to
move the bill’s focus further from biological definitions of sex, Section 3(a)(7)
fails to consider (or provide guidance regarding how to navigate through) its
analytical overlap with the Court’s expansive interpretation of Title VII.
Ultimately, the bill provides no clarity on what characteristics count and how
the judiciary should make a determination between characteristics and conduct
protected under either legislation in sex-stereotyping claims.181
In fact, even federal courts of appeals that have unambiguously struck
down claims motivated in part by sexual orientation as gender-nonconforming
conduct under Title VII have suggested “outward workplace manifestation of
less-than-masculine gender characteristics,” including dress and mannerisms,
fall well within the scope of Title VII.182 Thus, if passed into law, and without
a precise roadmap of how to distinguish sex-stereotyping claims under
Title VII and claims based on gender identity under the current ENDA bill,
courts would be left with a mirage of complex class definitions. More
importantly, claimants, specifically persons subject to adverse employment
actions because of outwards expressions of abstract support for gays and
lesbians, would be left unsure as to where to look in their pursuit of justice.
Certainly statutory solutions should be explored further and perfected in
time. Yet, as an initial, critical step toward immediately and fully addressing
workplace animus directed at those who fail to achieve societal notions of
178

Id. § 4(e) (emphasis added).
Id. § 3(a)(7).
180 Id. The bill’s inclusion of gender identity, without distinguishing gender-nonconforming conduct
protected under Title VII, fails to clarify the judicial fact-finding process.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2006) (Lawson, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the court recognize claims motivated in part by sexual orientation as gender-nonconforming
conduct but limit its scope to “outward workplace manifestation of less-than-masculine gender
characteristics”).
179
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gender, an expansive interpretation—informed by social science and cognizant
of sexuality’s role in this process—serves to expedite this bright future.
III. LEANING INTO REALITY: CRITIQUES AND PROSPECTIVE CHALLENGES
This Part proceeds in two sections. First, section A counters potential
critics of an expansive judicial interpretation of discrimination on the basis of
sex who question the practical application of such an interpretation, given the
diversity of gender expression within the LGBT community, the fear of
judicial ossification, and the potential for overzealous judicial activism and
bias. Second, section B addresses and briefly explores contemporary
vulnerability scholarship that supports both the wholesale abandonment of
class-based structures and the creation of a new regime which, in order to more
adequately protect the dignity of each employee, recognizes the universal
vulnerability of the human experience.
A. The Gender-Conformity Problem
This section first examines the practical challenges of utilizing an
expansive interpretation of “sex” in Title VII jurisprudence. Second, this
section explores potential criticisms that call for the use of judicially imposed
limitations to gender-nonconforming conduct for the sake of judicial
efficiency. Third, this section confronts the potential critique that such
expansive interpretation would empower judicial activism and bias by
enlarging the realm of judicial discretion under Title VII. Finally, this section
explores Title VII itself, surveying the delegation of responsibility to federal
courts to interpret and enforce its key provisions, including the scope of
unlawful discrimination, paying special attention to the unique challenge posed
by persons whose gender-nonconforming behavior transcends outward manner
or dress.
While an expansive interpretation of sex, and gender-nonconforming
conduct, would more accurately embody contemporary social science183 on the
construction of gender in hegemonic work environments and address “the
history and persistent, widespread pattern of discrimination . . . by private
sector employers and local, State, and Federal employers,”184 it would not
come without practical challenges in its judicial use. Gender, as this Comment
183 See Kimmel, supra note 87, at 133 (noting that, in many hegemonic work environments, masculinity is
achieved by not being a woman and demonstrating one’s heterosexuality).
184 S. 815 § 2(1).
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has shown, is a fluid sociological concept, sensitive to context and
perception.185 What fails to conform to societal expectations of gendered
behavior in one setting will inevitably coincide in another.186 Moreover, since
Price Waterhouse, the judiciary has played the essential function of examining
fact and defining the boundary of such protected nonconforming conduct.187
This Comment has argued for an expansive and more sociologically informed
use of this role, and must address potential critics, suspicious of judicial
activism188 and fearful of an ill-informed and arguably biased judiciary
defining the boundaries of gendered expectations.189
First, drawing a judicial line in the sand between protected
gender-nonconforming conduct and expression outside the scope of Title
VII190 is an unworkable, insensitive solution in a contemporary employment
context that forecloses legitimate claims and negates societal change. Limiting
actionable claims to nonconforming dress or expression within the workplace
would craft a fixed judicial definition of gender that both fails to recognize the
range of conduct used in contemporary contexts to achieve and reinforce
gender identity and excludes the recognition of adjustment in societal
definitions of gender over time. While inflexible rules and judicially imposed
185 See Kimmel, supra note 87, at 124 (asserting that conceptions of gender lack universal equality and
vary across cultures and contexts).
186 See id.
187 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (establishing liability where
discrimination resulted from an employer’s perception of an employee’s failure to conform to gender
stereotypes).
188 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1289–92 (1982) (noting that since Justice Stone’s famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.—which asserted that there may be a “narrower scope of operation of the presumption of
constitutionality” when legislation or action seems to affect Constitutional rights of “discrete and insular
minorities” otherwise incapable of resorting to the “political processes”—the Court has often extended “the
scope of judicial review” where minority group interests are vulnerable to “perversions [of] the majoritarian
process” (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938))); Ernest A. Young,
Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1139–40 (2002) (asserting that many
critics have accused the Court’s “five conservative justices” of “usurp[ing] the power to govern by striking
down or weakening federal and state laws” and having “somehow overstepped its institutional role”). Critics
of judicial activism focus their attention on “the judiciary’s institutional role rather than the merits of particular
decisions,” yet recognize “activism” is hard to define and identify. Young, supra, at 1141.
189 See Judith M. Billings & Brenda Murray, Introduction to the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force
Report: The Effects of Gender, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 739, 741 (1994) (“Gender bias in the courts interferes with
the very objectiveness, fairness, and impartiality that are critical to the judicial process . . . .”). Although the
judiciary has been reluctant to recognize gender bias as “an issue,” the “Ninth Circuit Report on Gender Bias
in the Courts . . . demonstrate[s] that gender bias exists in federal courts, and that steps must be taken within
the federal system to eliminate [it].” Id. at 741, 743.
190 See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2006) (Lawson, J., dissenting).
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limitations on gendered conduct may work to clarify and expedite the process
of examining facts in claims of workplace discrimination, recognizing the most
expansive interpretation would anticipate and recognize the fluidity of gender
as a sociological concept.
In fact, failure to recognize the reality of gender fluidity in contemporary
society exemplifies such conservative judicial activism that many argue
“involve[s] a refusal by the court deciding a particular case to defer to other
sorts of authority at the expense of its own independent judgment.”191 While it
may be argued that broadening the scope of conduct potentially protected
under Title VII may lead, contrarily, to forms of judicial activism based on
liberal judicial biases, use of an expansive interpretation—at the very least—
ensures claims will not be dismissed due to preexisting judicial sentiments on
gendered conduct.
Second, federal courts have an unequivocal duty to examine all relevant
facts and factors in a Title VII sex-stereotyping suit. While many scholars
would argue that expanding the scope of conduct protected under Title VII
would result in greater judicial discretion to exhibit “gender bias,”192 such
critiques or judicial improprieties cannot excuse the judiciary’s duty to
examine the facts surrounding each claim of workplace discrimination to
determine if adverse action resulted from or was motivated in part by conduct
that failed to meet gender norms of the particular work environment. Indeed,
courts have long fulfilled the role of determining preliminary questions of fact
and are capable of determining—based on evidence—the gendered
expectations of each work environment. While Congress often delegates
significant interpretive authority to administrative agencies in the
administering of civil rights statutes, “the ultimate authority for interpreting
and enforcing their terms is vested in the federal courts.”193 Empowering the
judiciary to define and examine the scope of statutorily ambiguous terms like
“sex” allows “Congress to take credit for addressing general problems [like
workplace discrimination] without confronting the details that divide
legislators and their supporters.”194 Moreover, while some may argue that
courts suffer from a lack of expertise in determining and defining the scope of
sociological concepts like gender, others argue that “judges possess a
191

Young, supra note 188, at 1145.
Billings & Murray, supra note 189, at 741.
193 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 371 (2010).
194 See id. at 372.
192
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distinctive form of expertise as a result of their experience resolving legal
disputes.”195
In 1964, when Congress enacted Title VII, “Congress faced powerful
pressure to combat . . . discrimination, but cross-cutting divisions in both
[political] parties made action difficult.”196 In such contexts, many scholars
have recognized the Congressional tendency “to paint with a broad brush,
leaving significant questions to be worked out by a delegate.”197
Third, given the federal court’s statutory mandate to flesh out the scope of
actionable discrimination, criticism of an expansive interpretation misplaces its
focus and ignores the ubiquity of judicial bias. In Title VII, Congress
essentially “hollowed out the enforcement authority” of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), divvying up such authority “among the
EEOC, the federal courts, and the Department of Justice.”198 Under Title VII,
“[t]he EEOC was given authority to process and investigate claims and to seek
‘informal’ conciliation with employers when it found reasonable cause to
believe discrimination had occurred.”199 Ultimately, primary enforcement
power was vested “in the federal courts,” and “Congress delegated to the
EEOC the power to create procedural rules” while leaving interpretive
authority over “[s]ubstantive issues” such as “the critical details of what
constitutes prohibited ‘discrimination’” to the courts.200 Thus, critics of judicial
bias need not challenge a more sociologically informed examination of gender
norms but should instead focus their attentions toward the underlying culprit
itself: judicial bias.
Finally, LGBT persons whose outward mannerisms and dress conform with
societal norms may, unintentionally, be left out of the fold of protection when
their expressive conduct or associations with avowedly homosexual persons or
organizations fail to coalesce with expected conduct where courts adopt
judicial limits on the scope of gender under Title VII. While recent decisions
by the EEOC seem to favor an expansive interpretation of what constitutes

195

Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
Id. at 382.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 384 (quoting Robert C. Lieberman, Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political
Change, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 697, 707 (2002)).
199 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012)).
200 Id. at 384–85.
196
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sexual discrimination in the context of claims by transgender employees,201
finding that “discriminating . . . on the basis of gender identity [is] indeed
considered discriminatory under Title VII because it penalizes [transgendered
workers] for failing to conform to gender stereotypes,” such decisions are
merely persuasive as they are “only binding [on] federal employers.”202
Moreover, while the EEOC’s interpretations “tend to influence the courts,” the
EEOC and courts alike have been reluctant to recognize conduct—including
LGBT identity or affinity with LGBT organizations—that is not readily visible
to others within the work environment.203 Consequently, what would seem to
clarify the boundary of gender—for example, a rule limiting protected
gendered conduct to mannerisms or dress within the workplace—would, in
fact, reify the all-too-impossible judicial challenge of drawing a border around
societal norms of gender.
B. A Call to Action: Reenvisioning Civil Rights in the Wake of ENDA
This section, first, briefly examines the contemporary class-based statutory
regime’s failure to adequately prevent discrimination and adequately protect
equality of opportunity in a modern work environment. Second, this section
explores the alternative concept of vulnerability, which argues for a
reconceptualization of civil rights protections that recognizes the particular
social locations and structural disadvantage of persons who cannot be readily
encompassed by an insular and discrete class. Third, this section asks whether
class-based structures inadequately serve the intent of Congress in rooting out
workplace discrimination. Finally, this section reaffirms the call for the Court
to embody—as an initial step—a more sociologically informed interpretation
of sex.
Even if ENDA is eventually passed and ushers in an era of explicit
workplace protections against discrimination on the basis of “sexual

201 For example, an April 2012 EEOC decision, finding for Mia Macy—a former male police detective
who was denied employment with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms after she told the agency
about her plans to change her gender—held, “intentional discrimination against a transgender individual
because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination
therefore violates Title VII.” Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1, *11 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
202 Tara Siegel Bernard, Fired for Being Gay? Protections Are Piecemeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/your-money/protections-for-gays-in-workplace-arepiecemeal.html.
203 See id. (providing the interpretive expansion to protect transgender and LGBT persons has been “slow
and expensive” with “no guarantees”).

PEEBLES GALLEYSPROOFS2

948

2/19/2015 12:41 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:911

orientation” and “gender identity,” coverage, as previously explored,204
remains unclear.205 Moreover, before concluding, it is important to recognize a
considerable body of scholarship that encourages an altogether unique
approach to protecting civil rights. For example, Martha Albertson Fineman, in
The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, argues that “[b]ecause
identities have been the focus of major civil rights struggles in American
society,” and because “characteristics such as gender, race, and religion define
which groups are those primarily protected by our equality laws,” class-based
systems do not serve to root out “discrimination in general” but “only
discrimination based on those designated distinguishing characteristics.”206
Such structures, which Fineman contends are grossly inadequate for preserving
equal employment opportunity for all, have “set up a perverse dynamic that
often results in pitting one protected group against another,” serve to corrode
alliances across marginalized groups, and fail to address inequality or groups
who have yet to demonstrate the accumulation of a “sufficiently lengthy
history” of animus.207
Certainly, Congress need not anticipate all evils in drafting civil rights
legislation and is free to amend and clarify as it sees fit. However, as history
and both the 1978 and 1991 amendments to Title VII reveal,208 class-based
regimes can and have left certain groups unprotected. As critics of class-based
regimes argue, in the United States, where “no constitutional guarantee to basic
social goods, such as housing, education, or healthcare” exists, discrimination
doctrine plays an important contemporary role for groups seeking protection

204
205
206

See supra notes 169–81 and accompanying text.
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(7), (10).
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 252

(2010).
207

Id. at 253.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of Title 42 of the U.S. Code) (extending Title VII to include American and Americancontrolled employers operating abroad, as well as codifying the prohibition against disparate impact
discrimination and the “business necessity” and “job related” defenses to Title VII liability); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2012)) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . .”). That
Congress has repeatedly expanded the scope of Title VII evidences the potential need to explode the
class-based structure altogether.
208
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from the state, couching notions “that America provides for real equal access
and opportunity.”209
While this Comment does not address, in depth, alternatives to Title VII’s
class-based framework, in examining the feasibility and implications of a new
and expansive interpretation of what constitutes discrimination based on sex,
Fineman’s concept of “vulnerability” sheds light on important facets of current
civil rights legislation that work to frustrate Title VII’s purpose of providing
equal employment opportunity for all.210 According to Fineman, vulnerability
is posited as “the characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as
human beings . . . suggest[ing] a relationship of responsibility between state
and individual.”211 Ultimately, vulnerability scholarship posits that civil rights
laws that purport to ensure “true equality of opportunity” impose an
“obligation on the state to ensure that access to the societal institutions that
distribute social goods, such as wealth, health, employment, or security, is
generally open to all.”212 Perhaps, as such scholars suggest, there is something
more fundamental, altogether distinct from class definition, line-drawing, and
group identity, which Title VII and similar civil rights laws have failed to
identify and safeguard: the vulnerable and valued human condition of the
employee.
While more scholarship can and should reimagine the way Congress
combats workplace discrimination, an expansive and more sociologically
informed interpretation of Title VII’s terms213 serves as a critical first step
toward protecting individuals214 “caught in systems of disadvantage that are
209 Fineman, supra note 206, at 254. According to Fineman, “one of the most troubling aspects of the
[current] identity approach to equality is that it narrowly focuses equality claims and takes only a limited view
of what should constitute governmental responsibility in regard to social justice.” Id.
210 Id. at 254–55. Autonomy “cannot be attained without an underlying provision of substantial assistance,
subsidy, and support from society and its institutions, which give individuals the resources they need
to . . . make choices.” Id. at 260. Moreover, in Western liberal democracies, equality is
“conceptualized . . . through a social contract.” Id. at 262–63. The premise of “a universal vulnerable subject
forms the foundation for the assertion that human vulnerability must be at the heart of our ideas of social and
state responsibility” and recognizes the “ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune” in the
employee. Id. at 267. Finally, Fineman’s concept of vulnerability is “particular,” recognizing ones individual
location “within webs of economic and institutional relationships.” Id. at 268–69.
211 Id. at 255.
212 Id. at 256.
213 For example, an interpretation that refuses to categorically declassify certain forms of conduct as
gender related, recognizing the performativity of heterosexuality required in hegemonic contexts to achieve
masculinity.
214 For example, heterosexual or homosexual persons whose expressive conduct or associations with
avowedly homosexual organizations fail to conform to societal norms of masculinity.
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almost impossible to transcend” or confined to a discrete class of persons.215
Likewise, while such an expansive view does not negate differences in
individual ability or initiative, it does call into question the responsive state’s
historic failure216 to adequately account for the imbalance of resources,
recognition,217 and what Fineman coins “resilience” to “address and confront
misfortune” within the workplace.218
CONCLUSION
The status quo leaves many LGBT and nonconforming persons incapable
of recourse and recognition, without a new and expansive judicial
interpretation of sex. When King Henry VIII ascended to the English throne in
1485, sex and gender already played an important role in social ordering and
monarchial rule.219 Young English monarchs felt the ubiquitous pressure to
procreate, produce a fertile line of heirs to the throne, and—more
importantly—to ensure the crown someday found its way to the head of a
prince.220 Historians have not only documented this perverse preference for
male heirs by European monarchs but have highlighted the complex role

215

Fineman, supra note 206, at 257.
The current class-based framework attempts to limit discrimination claims based on sex to a narrow
class of conduct and protects only those persons who fall well within the enumerated classes. Contrary to
Congress’s purported intent of curbing workplace discrimination and animus, “[a] person can be fired from
employment on a whim, for any reason whatsoever, . . . so long as it is not the result of discrimination based
on [a protected class].” Id. at 252.
217 In enacting Title VII, the state “set aside some groups considered disadvantaged within the larger
society.” Id. at 266. Fineman utilizes a concept of vulnerability “detached from specific subgroups, using it to
define the very meaning of what it means to be human,” avoiding “an air of victimhood, deprivation,
dependency, or pathology” that class-based structures often carry for members of such enumerated groups. Id.
218 Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted).
219 See GARTHINE WALKER, CRIME, GENDER AND SOCIAL ORDER IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 3–4
(2003) (“[A]ssumptions (largely unacknowledged) about gender often appear to be based on little other than
our own culture’s stereotypes, which may or may not be pertinent to the early modern period. . . . A few
behaviours for which women were disproportionately prosecuted relative to men are labeled as peculiarly
‘feminine’, such as witchcraft, infanticide and scolding.”). Historians of the period recognize both that gender
requires examination of “the individual subject as well as social organization and to articulate the nature of
their interrelationships,” and that in Tudor England, the notion “of the household as little commonwealth
conflated personal and public authority in a patriarchal and Christian vision in which the rule of husbands,
fathers, magistrates, ecclesiastics and monarchs each legitimated that of the others.” Id. at 8–9 (quoting Joan
W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST. REV. 1053, 1067 (1986)).
220 See Natalie Mears, Courts, Courtiers, and Culture in Tudor England, 46 HIST. J. 703, 716 (2003)
(providing that, in Tudor society, “women were [seen as] unfit to rule by Biblical and natural law” and even
Queen Elizabeth I was largely believed to be “gender disqualified . . . from claiming the throne through
inheritance”).
216
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gender played in both notions of monogamy, chastity, and class.221 In fact,
Henry VIII was known to adorn attire—although appropriate for well-to-do
Tudor men—that many, today, would view as well beyond the acceptable
boundaries of gendered dress: “fur[s],” elaborate “knee- or ankle-length
gown[s],” and “hose.”222 However, perhaps more importantly, under Henry’s
reign, English society was transformed by his ostentatious nonconformity with
religious and gender norms.223
Before his reign, divorce and extramarital affairs were both prohibited and
viewed with disdain; men did not find value in a modern humanist education;
and, the Pope—along with the Catholic Church—determined the boundaries of
appropriate conduct for Kings.224 Yet, when Pope Clement VII did not
immediately grant his requested annulment from Catherine of Aragon,225
Henry took matters into his own hands, refuting papal supremacy, establishing
the Church of England and his role as “supreme head of the Church,” issuing
in a number of statutes that clarified and distanced the relationship between
England and the Pope, and sanctioning the divorce from his wife, Catherine.226
Yet, LGBT and non-LGBT workers in the United States today who—either
through outward expression, identification, association, or assertive (and
nonassertive) conduct affiliated with LGBT identity—fail to conform with
societal expectations of how men or women should behave, lack Henry’s key
advantages: resources, recognition, and the capacity to rectify the law itself.
While societal expectations of gendered conduct have dramatically changed
since Henry’s reformation, legal conceptions remain slow to catch up.227 What
society expects of its men and women has undoubtedly changed; yet, the
221 See id. at 717–18 (positing that “women did not have the central political role assumed by men” and
that political counsel was “defined by men, in printed discourses and letters between those involved in
governance, as a male activity”). Mears suggests the royal “court” played an important role in defining the
scope of acceptable conduct and, indeed, arranging marriages between social elite. Id. at 719.
222 MARIA HAYWARD, RICH APPAREL: CLOTHING AND THE LAW IN HENRY VIII’S ENGLAND 115 (2009).
223 See ETHAN H. SHAGAN, POPULAR POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 29 (2003) (positing that
Henry VIII ushered in a “fundamental restructuring of power within the realm” following the annulment of his
marriage to Catherine of Aragon).
224 See id. at 29–33.
225 Henry VIII wished to secure an annulment from Catherine of Aragon for having failed to both produce
a male heir to the throne and secure the Tudor dynasty. See id. at 29.
226 Id. at 29–30.
227 See Case, supra note 60, at 17 (“Courts toss around the words ‘gender,’ ‘masculine,’ ‘feminine,’ and
‘sex-stereotyping’ . . . in sex discrimination cases. But they do not always use these terms consistently or
self-consciously . . . . Courts often conflate gender with sex and particularly with sexual orientation, often
without . . . being aware that they are doing so.”).
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performative nature of gender remains steadfast.228 Men today, as in 1485,
achieve masculinity through the public interplay of conduct, associations,
markers of identity, and professed beliefs that his community values or
conversely fears.229 Men perform, and indeed work to police their own
relationship with a hegemonic world, built upon notions of sexism and
dominance over women.230 The boundaries of gender, however subtle, are
known, encompassing nearly every social interaction in contemporary life.
From the time newborns are photographed—in pink or blue—gender and its
role in our hegemonic social order begins its work.231 Likewise, while gender
is a valued and fluid social construction for many (indeed sexuality, in part,
relies on preferences for gender performance),232 modern American law
mirrors the sociologically inaccurate and majoritarian conflation between
sex—the biologically limited—and gender—the socially constructed.233
When Congress prohibited workplace discrimination on the basis of sex, it
sought to ensure equal employment opportunities for women, who suffered
(and continue to suffer) significant disparities in hiring and compensation
compared with men.234 But, sex, as we have come to know, means much more.
228 See Kimmel, supra note 87, at 129 (noting that “[m]asculinity is a homosocial enactment,” in which
men “test [them]selves” and “perform heroic feats” because they want “other men to grant [them their]
manhood”).
229 Id. at 132. Kimmel asserts that “[a]s adolescents, we learn that our peers are a kind of gender police,
constantly threatening to unmask us, as feminine,” and young men are “constantly riding those gender
boundaries, checking the fences we have constructed on the perimeter, making sure nothing . . . feminine
might show through.” Id.
230 Id. at 133–34 (noting homophobia is “intimately interwoven with . . . sexism” and one “centerpiece[]
of . . . exaggerated masculinity is putting women down”).
231 See Case, supra note 60, at 20–31 (arguing that every aspect of our lives from toys to attire, even jobs,
are assigned a relationship to gender).
232 Kimmel notes that notions of gender change with time and, like contemporary gay men, throughout
history, “various groups have represented the sissy, the non-men against whom American men played out their
definitions of manhood,” including black slaves, Native Americans, and European immigrants. Kimmel, supra
note 87, at 134. But see Case, supra note 60, at 3 (suggesting the pressures on men and women to conform to
gender expectations may be “differential,” because “[w]anting to be masculine is understandable; it can be a
step up for a women, and the qualities associated with masculinity are also associated with success”).
233 See Case, supra note 60, at 9–10 (suggesting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s approach in the litigation
of sex discrimination during the 1970s “stands as both a hindrance and inspiration,” because although she
“point[ed] out that laws based on stereotypical assumptions about the sexes hurt both men and women who
violate these assumptions,” she was “in large part responsible for the fact that the words ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are
now used interchangeably in the law, creating . . . an unfortunate terminological gap”). Case argues that gender
should be associated with adjectives like “dominant” or “ambitious,” presumably leaving open the possibility
acting “gay” could fall under gender. See id. at 12.
234 Id. at 48 (“Congress’[s] intent to forbid employers to take gender [i.e., sex] into account in making
employment decisions appears on the face of the statute . . . .” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 239–40 (1989))).
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Title VII does not care about the “sex” of the plaintiff or discriminatory
actor;235 discrimination on the basis of sex has come to include discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy;236 and, most importantly, discrimination on the basis
of sex encompasses discrimination on the basis of gender.237 With what would
seem like a logical, and indeed minor, step, the Court in Price Waterhouse
extended the scope of workplace protections for a wide range of
gender-nonconforming conduct, on which courts are still seeking clarity and
direction. Social science would seem to provide such direction. While some
argue social science has been grossly abused by the judiciary,238 when the
Court defines the scope of congressional protections to include such
sociological concepts, it is imperative to recognize its value—and indeed
utility.
Federal agencies, lower courts, and—most importantly—workers seeking
to capitalize on idealistic promises of equal access and opportunity to work in
the United States have and continue to struggle to draw a line in the sand or
categorize conduct as within (and beyond) the scope of “gender.”239 Title VII
grants exclusive interpretive authority to the federal courts to flesh out the
scope of discrimination, and, in part, the judiciary has fulfilled its
responsibility. This Comment has advocated for an expansive interpretation of
235 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (concluding that it is “unwise
to presume” those “of one definable group will not discriminate against members” (quoting Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977))).
236 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)); see also Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991) (finding that a
policy barring employees “capable of bearing children” from jobs exposed to lead was actionable
discrimination based on sex).
237 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding a plaintiff has an actionable claim when he or she
“proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision”); see also Case, supra note 60,
at 4 (“[A]t least under Title VII, the existing statutory language and doctrinal categories, if correctly applied,
already provide the necessary protection to both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their
masculine counterparts.”).
238 See Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 4
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (suggesting even “defenders of the result” of landmark civil rights cases like Brown
v. Board of Education, which desegregated educational institutions formerly segregated based on race, have
argued the Court’s “use of social science to demonstrate the harm . . . imposed on black children was
unconvincing”).
239 See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (D.D.C. 2006) (“To the extent that
Title VII . . . prohibits sex stereotyping alone, it does so to allow women . . . to express their individual female
identities without being punished for being ‘macho,’ or for men to express their individual male identities
without reprisal for being perceived as effeminate. In other words, it creates space for people of both sexes to
express their sexual identity in nonconforming ways.”). But see Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., LLC,
591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 2010) (looking to discrimination based upon dress or physical appearance in
examining the boundary of actionable claims under Title VII’s definition of sex).
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discrimination based on sex and gender that serves, in an era of increasing
gender fluidity, equality initiatives for LGBT persons, and openness, to
recognize contemporary notions surrounding gender. Ultimately, without the
judicial gumption and freedom to recognize the broad scope of conduct and
identity itself that can, and often does, work to reify gender in contemporary
workplaces, the judiciary will continue to fail Title VII’s central mission—
blind to the social realities of hegemonic masculinity and its potent capacity to
both safeguard equal opportunity and fully combat unlawful discrimination.
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